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1. See generally, ANGELO A. ANCHETA, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE
LAW (2006); ROSEMARY J. ERICKSON & RITA J. SIMON, THE USE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA IN SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS (1998); THE USE-NONUSE-MISUSE OF APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE COURTS
(Micheal J. Saks & Charles H. Baron eds., 1980);  see also Noam Cohen, Courts Turn to Wikipedia, but
Selectively, N Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2007 available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/29/technology/
29wikipedia.html?ex=1184731200&en=70f2d3a8a7ac4052&ei=5070 (discussing the recent trend towards
judicial reliance on Wikipedia, the free online collaborative encyclopedia).
2. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  In the opinion’s famous footnote eleven, Chief
Justice Earl Warren supported the Court’s conclusion as to the constitutionality of separate-but-equal
schooling by reference to several studies on the harms of racially segregated education.  The move drew
heavy fire from commentators on both sides of the debate.  Id. at 495.  See ANCHETA, supra note 1, at 1-2.
3. Judicial opinion itself can attest to this.  In his dissent, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia,
noted that “[t]he Court relies heavily on social science evidence to justify its deference,” and that “no social
science has disproved the notion that this discrimination engenders attitudes of superiority or, alternatively,
provokes resentment among those who believe that they have been wronged by the government’s use of
race.”  Grutter v Bollinger, 539, 364, 373 U.S. 306 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).  In
his concurrence, Justice Thomas criticises the dissent for “unquestioningly cit[ing] certain social science
research to support propositions that are hotly disputed among social scientists,” and for seeking to “leave
our equal-protection jurisprudence at the mercy of elected government officials evaluating the evanescent
views of a handful of social scientists,” Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct.
2738, 2778 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).  In response, the four Justice dissent asserts that “[i]f we are
to insist upon unanimity in the social science literature before finding a compelling interest, we might never
find one.”  Id. at 2824 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
4. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).  See Peter Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 46-62 (2002) (providing a synopsis of the political history of affirmative action).
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I.  INTRODUCTION
The fate of social science at the hands of lawyers has always provoked
debate.1  Such is the suspicion that greets its appearance in judicial opinions
that even US Supreme Court unanimity is unable to avert controversy.2
Nowhere is lawyerly appeal to social science more contentious than in the
sphere of affirmative action.3  Yet however problematic it may be to rely on
contested findings, a lawyer’s view of the costs and benefits of minority
preferencing will inevitably shape his thinking on its legitimacy as a tool of
public policy.  Accordingly, the question of the impact of affirmative action
has been prominent in judicial opinions ever since the Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke decision,4 in which five members of the
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5. To take Justice Powell’s pivotal opinion, “[t]he atmosphere of speculation, experiment and
creation—so essential to the quality of higher education—is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse
student body.”  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312.
6. See, e.g., the literature cited infra in notes 24, 29, and 77 (highlighting an intensely contested
issue). 
7. “It is regrettable when any citizen’s expectations are defeated by new programs serving some
more general concern[.]”  Ronald Dworkin, Why Bakke Has No Case, 24 N.Y. REV. BOOKS No.18 (Nov.
10, 1977).  Note also, Justice Powell’s remark in Bakke that “[s]uch rights [those affected by an admissions
program involving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin] are not absolute.”  Bakke, 438
U.S. at 320. 
8. For decisions emphasizing the impact on whites see United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149,
171 (1987) (describing that narrow tailoring depends in part on “the impact of the [race-conscious action]
on the rights of third parties”); see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 281-83 (1986)
(evaluating the burden on ‘innocent’ parties imposed by race-based hiring goals as part of narrow tailoring
inquiry); Tuttle v. Arlington County School Board, 195 F.3d 698, 707 (4th Cir. 1999) (considering “the
burden of the Policy on innocent third parties” in determining whether a local school district’s race-
conscious admissions policy was narrowly tailored).
9. Professor Goodwin Liu demonstrates the erroneous conflation of “the magnitude of affirmative
action’s instrumental benefit to minority applicants, which is large, with the magnitude of its instrumental
cost to white applicants, which is small.”  See Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic
Arithmetic of Selective Admissions, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1048 (2002).
Supreme Court famously held that the consideration of race in university
admission decisions was not invariably prohibited by the Constitution.5  In
defending their decisions on the use of race, we can expect judges to continue
to engage with what social science has to say about its consequences.  
Unlike the question of the effect of affirmative action on the long-term
prospects of its recipients,6 that of its impact on majority race applications is
susceptible to a straightforward mathematical analysis.  Fittingly, mathe-
matical terrain is where this question has been resolved.  At one time, justifi-
cation aside,7 minority preferences were seen as materially handicapping a
typical white candidate’s application.8  One version of this view held that
under a policy of affirmative action the difference in the likelihoods of success
enjoyed by otherwise equivalent white and minority applicants represented the
percentage of disadvantage imposed by the policy on the prospects of the
former.9  This might be described as the maximalist position on the effect of
minority preferencing on majority applicants. 
Imagine, however, the question is answered in the negative; that the
impact of minority preferences on the typical white applicant is negligible.  In
this scenario, policies of affirmative action would possess fewer drawbacks.
“Innocent whites” could no longer be seen as having been truly disadvantaged.
To that extent, the case for introducing affirmative action would come to
appear more compelling, or at least less problematic.  Just such a shift in the
terms of the debate has in fact taken place.  In recent years, a consensus has
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10. See generally id.
11. WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF
CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS (1998).  Leading advocates of affirmative
action in U.S. higher education, Bowen and Bok served as presidents of Princeton and Harvard universities
respectively.  
12. See Jonathan Alger & Marvin Krislov, You’ve Got to Have Friends: Lessons Learned From the
Role of Amici in the University of Michigan Cases, 30 J.C. & U.L. 503 at n.134 (2004); Ian Ayres, Is
Discrimination Elusive?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2419 at n.19 (2003); Christopher Bracey, The Cul de Sac of
developed among both advocates and opponents that the actual effects of
minority preferencing on the typical white applicant are minimal.  
In this essay, we will reconsider the grounds for this consensus.  First, the
essay establishes the level of agreement among judges and academics on the
triviality of the effect of affirmative action on the white applicant’s prospects
of success (Part II).  Second, the essay demonstrates how the prevailing
position on the impact of minority preferencing on the white applicant is
flawed in regard to both the calculation of relative admission likelihood and
the application of the matriculant “yield” variable (Part III).  The essay
concludes by challenging the tendency to take the effects of affirmative action
(on both preferred and non-preferred applicants) as exclusively indicative of
its costs (Part IV).   
In Part III, we make use of several case studies reviewed in the literature
and show how these studies convey a rather different picture of the arithmetic
of minority preferencing.  In summary, the aim of the essay is to clarify the
mathematics of the effect of affirmative action on majority applicants.  In Part
IV, I distinguish that question from that of its opportunity cost.  The essay’s
scope is narrow—but its focus is justifiable.  If there is any element of the
debate on affirmative action that may be settled by something as straight-
forward as arithmetic, it is surely worth settling.   
II.  THE CONSENSUS ON THE STAKES FOR WHITES
That the stakes for white applicants in the maintenance of affirmative
action are minimal is now a matter of widespread, if sometimes grudging,
agreement.  The prevalence of this view is due in large part to the impact of
a 2002 law review article by Professor Goodwin Liu.10  Building on the
findings of Professors William Bowen and Derek Bok in their seminal work
on affirmative action, The Shape of the River,11 Liu set out to dispel the
“causation fallacy,” that white applicants are significantly disadvantaged by
the operation of preferencing in favor of minority applicants with whom they
are competing for a particular pool of resources.  The academic reception of
Liu’s claim and the mathematical reasoning underlying it has been uniformly
positive.12  Indeed, the scholarly standing of Liu’s thesis is such that 
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Race Preference Discourse, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231 at n.29 (2006); Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative
Inaction, 50 HOW. L. J. 611 at n.67 (2007); Barbara J. Flagg, Diversity Discourses, 78 TULANE L. REV.
827, 830 (2004) (“As Goodwin Liu has demonstrated, an individual white applicant’s chance of admission
at a selective school is barely affected by the presence of an ‘affirmative action’ policy that gives some
weight to minority status.”); Kerstin Forsythe, Racial Preference and Affirmative Action in Law Schools:
Reactions from Minnesota Law Schools and Ramifications for Higher Education in the wake of Grutter
v. Bollinger, 25 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 157 at n.49 (2003); Shira Galinsky, Returning the Language
of Fairness to Equal Protection: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Affirmative Action Jurisprudence in
Grutter and Gratz and Beyond, 7 N.Y. CITY. L. REV. 357, 375 (2004) (“[A]ffirmative action in university
admissions . . . does not impose an undue burden on white students, as demonstrated by a study showing
that the statistical chances for the acceptance of white applicants are not significantly diminished[.]” (citing
Liu, supra note 9)); Joel K. Goldstein, Justice O’Connor’s Twenty-Five Year Expectation: The Legitimacy
of Durational Limits in Grutter, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 83, 126 (2003) (“[R]race-conscious admissions . . . reduce
the chances of a majority applicant by a relatively trivial percentage.” (citing Liu, supra note 9)); Lani
Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of our Democratic Ideals, 117
HARV. L. REV. 113, 151 (2003) (“[T]he number of whites adversely affected by affirmative action is
miniscule.”) (citing Liu, supra note 9)); D. Holley-Walker, Narrative Highground: The Failure of
Intervention as a Procedural Device in Affirmative Action Litigation, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 103 at n.7
(2003); Josh Hsu, Asian American Judges: Identity, Their Narratives, & Diversity on the Bench, 11 ASIAN
PAC. AM. L.J. 92 at n.109 (2006) ((citing Liu, supra note 9 (debunking certain myths regarding affirmative
action)); Kevin R. Johnson & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Cry Me a River: The Limits of “A Systemic
Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools”, 7 AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 1 at n.48 (2005)
(“In light of the small number of African Americans in law schools, it is difficult to see how race-conscious
admissions could have much of an impact on white applicants. (citing Liu, supra note 9)); Trina Jones,
Brown II: A Case of Missed Opportunity?, 24 L. & INEQ. 9 at n.74 (2006); P. Karlan, John Hart Ely and
the Problem of Gerrymandering: The Lion in Winter, 114 YALE. L. J. 1329 at n.82 (2005) (“As Goodwin
Liu explains, the burden on any particular rejected applicant is quite minor, given the small effect
affirmative action has on any one nonbeneficiary applicant’s chance of admission.”); Pauline T. Kim, The
Colorblind Lottery, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 9, 28 (2003) (“[A]s Goodwin Liu has demonstrated, the basic
arithmetic of highly selective admissions indicates that . . . racial preferences have very little effect on the
chance of admission for any individual member of the much larger class of white applicants.”); Law Review
Digest, 32 J.L. & EDUC. 281, 283 (2003) (“The author makes a convincing argument that . . . statistical
analysis leads to the conclusion that affirmative action does not greatly burden white applicants.”); Mexican
American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF), Blend It, Don’t End It: Affirmative Action and
the Texas Ten Percent Plan after Grutter and Gratz, 8 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 33, 43 (2005) (“[I]t must
be pointed out that at highly selective institutions the presence of affirmative action typically has a quite
minimal effect on the admission rates for white applicants.” (citing Liu, supra note 9)); Jason Morgan-
Foster, From Hutchins Hall to Hyderabad and Beyond: A Comparative Look at Affirmative Action in Three
Jurisdictions 9 WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 73, 93 (2003); Richard Primus, Equal Protection
and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493 at n.270 (2003); Kermit Roosevelt,
Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649 at n.180
(2005) (“Thus the fact that affirmative action programs impose only a statistically minimal disadvantage
on white applicants . . . is not relevant to the Court's calculus.” (citing Liu, supra note 9)); Shaakirrah R.
Sanders, Twenty-Five Years of a Divided Court and Nation: “Conflicting” Views of Affirmative Action and
Reverse Discrimination, 26 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 61 at n.346 (2003); Dennis J. Shields, A View
from the Files: Law School Admissions and Affirmative Action, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 731, 743 (2003),
(“[T]he point is that the admission of some minority students to the University of Michigan Law School
as a result of affirmative action had no impact on Ms. Grutter specifically, and little impact on nearly all
other nonminority candidates at Michigan[.]”(citing Liu, supra note 9)); Neil S. Siegel, Race-Conscious
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Student Assignment Plans: Balkanization, Integration, and Individualised Consideration, 56 DUKE L.J.
781 at n.112 (2006); Girardeau A. Spann, The Dark Side of Grutter, 21 CONST. COMMENT 221 at n.71
(2004) (“[T]he abolition of affirmative action will not significantly increase the probability that particular
white applicants will be admitted to the program.” (citing Liu, supra note 9)); Marcia G. Synnott, The
Evolving Diversity Rationale in University Admissions: From Regents v. Bakke to the University of
Michigan Cases, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 463, 497 (2005) (“If elite colleges did not engage in affirmative
action, most white applicants would increase their chances of admissions by only one-fifth of a percent.”
(citing Liu, supra note 9)); Robert E. Thomas & Bruce Louis Rich, Under the Radar: The Resistance of
Promotion Biases to Market Economic Forces, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 301 at n.151 (2005); Ronald Turner,
The Too-Many-Minorities and Racegoating Dynamics of the Anti-Affirmative-Action Position: From Bakke
to Grutter and Beyond, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 445 at n.16 (2003); Robert Paul Wolff & Tobias
Barrington Wolff, The Pimple on Adonis’s Nose: A Dialogue on the concept of Merit in the Affirmative
Action Debate, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 379 at n.73 (2005) ((citing Liu, supra note 9 (demonstrating the flawed
nature of arguments about tangible harm experienced by White applicants in affirmative action programs));
Frank H. Wu, The Arrival of Asian Americans: an Agenda for Legal Scholarship, 10 ASIAN L.J. 1, at n.28
(2003) (“Goodwin Liu[’s] . . . critique of the ‘Bakke fallacy’ debunks the notion that every non-beneficiary
of the programs has been directly harmed by their operation.” (citing Liu, supra note 9)); Note, After
Sandoval: Judicial Challenges and Administrative Possibilities in Title VI Enforcement, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 1774 at n.53 (2003) (citing Liu, supra note 9 (demonstrating the statistically insignificant effect of
affirmative action on white students’ admissions chances)).
13. William C. Kidder, Negative Action Versus Affirmative Action: Asian Pacific Americans Are
Still Caught in the Crossfire, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 605, 612 (2006).
14. See, for instance, Justice Kennedy stating in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Scalia,
“[w]hether or not such programs can be described as ‘remedial,’ the message conveyed is that it is
acceptable to harm a member of the group excluded from the benefit or privilege.” Metro Broadcasting, Inc
v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 636 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Judge Smith’s majority opinion
stating “[t]he beneficiaries of this system [the affirmative action program of the University of Texas Law
School] are blacks and Mexican Americans, to the detriment of whites and non-preferred minorities.”
Hopwood v. Texas 78 F.3d 932, 934 (5th Cir. 1996).  In his opinion for the majority, Judge Marcus states:
it is clear that literally hundreds of talented young men and women hoping to attend UGA
passed through the TSI stage [a stage in the selection process at which race is taken into
account], and for some, if not many, of those individuals—including the Plaintiffs in this
lawsuit—race denied them a coveted place in UGA’s freshman class.  
Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Georgia, 263 F.3d 1234, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001).  Indeed, since the
admission of the Johnson plaintiffs would only have been guaranteed if they had themselves been granted
the ‘race’ bonus, the latter holding appears to articulate the maximalist position on the effect of minority
preferencing on majority applicants.  In other words, the Johnson Court seems to have equated the
magnitude of the disadvantage to majority applicants with the magnitude of the advantage to minority
applicants.  Given that, on the Court’s own figures, the simple abolition of the race bonus would in no way
have assured the admission of the Johnson plaintiffs, the judgment incorrectly attributes the cause of their
rejection to affirmative action.  
divergence from its presumed implications is regarded as not merely mistaken,
but “surprising”.13
Judicial discourse has reflected this reception.  Whereas skeptical judges
once railed against the implications of affirmative action for the ordinary
white applicant,14 the point appears to have been tacitly abandoned.  The
prevailing judicial contribution to the ongoing debate on affirmative action in
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15. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
16. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
17. 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002).
18. Id. at 766.
19. Goodwin Liu, The Myth & Math of Affirmative Action, WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 2002, at B01.
20. Grutter, 288 F.3d at 809 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
21. Judge Boggs’s dissent states:
To say that it is a matter of less importance that ten people are each deprived of a one-tenth
chance of admission because of race than if one person is completely excluded from
admission is to ignore both mathematics and our system of deciding cases and controversies.
If Grutter’s rights have been violated, the degree of the violation and the proper remedy are
matters for the district court to determine in the first instance.  
Id.
university admissions was defined in the 2003 cases of Grutter v. Bollinger15
and Gratz v. University of Michigan.16  Barbara Grutter and Jennifer Gratz
were aggrieved white applicants seeking review of the University of
Michigan’s refusal to admit them to its Law School and its undergraduate
College respectively.  In the Sixth Circuit’s disposition of Grutter v.
Bollinger,17 Judge Clay’s concurrence joined four of the five-judge majority
in favor of the constitutionality of the admissions plan at issue, setting out the
existence of “nothing to indicate that the law school’s admission’s policy
ha[d] ‘taken’ anything from the ‘Barbara Grutters of our society.’”18  Support
for this proposition was drawn exclusively from a Washington Post op-ed by
Liu based on his aforementioned law review article.19  In response, the three-
judge dissenting opinion by Judge Boggs addressed the Liu study directly:
The concurring opinion and Liu may not characterize that wrong as
a “substantial disadvantage,” but the deprivation of equal considera-
tion is a wrong to which the Constitution is opposed. . . . To say that
Grutter’s claims are to be ignored because the whole system that she
has challenged has a relatively small discriminatory impact or because
the magnitude of the violation as to her is small is to say that she has
no rights that this court is bound to respect.20
In effect, the leading Circuit dissent in Grutter accepted the statistical
conclusions of the Liu study, specifically that affirmative action presents a
minimal burden for the typical white applicant.  The ground of “substantial
disadvantage” having been conceded, Judge Boggs was left with little by
which to characterize the applicant’s injury as justifiably overcoming the
state’s interest.  To rebut the implications of Liu’s findings, the dissent was
obliged to rely on the proposition that any constitutional wrong which
negatively affects an individual’s interests (to any degree) may be litigated by
that individual.21  That the “minimal majority burden” position has become
common ground amongst judicial advocates and opponents of affirmative
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22. The Supreme Court granted certiorari for Gratz before the Court of Appeals could render its
judgment.  
23. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 249-82.
24. Id. at 262.
25. Id. at 268.
26. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 303 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
27. Bracey, supra note 12, at n.57 (citing Liu, supra note 9).
action is confirmed in the Supreme Court’s approach.  In Gratz, the Court
ruled against the University of Michigan’s twenty-point admissions credit for
minority race applicants.22  Neither the majority or concurring opinions cited
any injury suffered by majority applicants by virtue of the points credit.23  To
ground its finding in the fact that the petitioner had been denied the
opportunity to compete on an equal basis with minority applicants, the Court
noted simply that he had been “denied admission even though an
underrepresented minority applicant with his qualifications would have been
admitted.”24  Evidently, the fact that an applicant would have been granted
admission had he benefited from a preference does not mean that in the
absence of such preferences he would have been granted admission.  A
litigant’s situation cannot be remedied by a preference’s abolition where his
claim against the inequality of the preference is merely that he does not enjoy
its relative benefits.  Likewise, the claim that an applicant ought to have been
included in a class which will gain special benefits is logically distinct from
the claim that there ought to have been no such special class.  Put differently,
rather than supporting its finding of unconstitutionality by identifying an
injury caused by the existence of the racial preference, the Court merely
identified a scenario in which the application of the preference, had it been
constitutional, would have caused an injury.25  Traditional invocations of the
harm caused to majority “innocents” are nowhere to be found.  On the other
hand, citing to Liu, the Ginsburg-Souter dissent makes explicit reference to
the absence of such harm, “[n]or has there been any demonstration that the
College’s program unduly constricts admissions opportunities for students
who do not receive special consideration based on race.”26  Conversely,
Christopher Bracey notes that “[t]he dissenting Justices in Grutter did not
address the issue of white innocence directly, in part . . . because recent
empirical studies suggested that the reduction in the probability of any white
student being admitted because of the existence of an affirmative action policy
was extremely modest.”27
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28. Liu’s mathematical analysis, though the most prominent on the point, is by no means alone.  In
The Shape of the River, Bowen and Bok note that if affirmative action is not used, “the overall white
probability of admission would rise by only one and one-half percentage points: from 25 percent [with
affirmative action] to roughly 26.5 percent [without affirmative action].”  BOWEN & BOK, supra note 12,
at 36.  In a review of The Shape of the River, the foregoing conclusion was said to be “[o]ne of the most
important findings of the study.”  Michael Selmi, The Facts of Affirmative Action, 85 VA. L. REV. 697, 708
(1999).  Subsequent affirmative action scholarship has indeed relied upon this conclusion.  See e.g., Turner,
supra note 12.  Ronald Turner uses this conclusion to ground his theory of “racegoating.”  Id. n.16.  
Judicial debate has also cited this conclusion:  “William Bowen and Derek Bok showed in their 1998 book,
‘The Shape of the River,’ that eliminating racial preferences would have increased the likelihood of
admission for white undergraduate applicants from 25 percent to only 26.5 percent.”  Grutter, 288 F.3d at
767 (Clay J., concurring).  Critically, however, we are not reminded that an increase of X number of
percentage points is far more significant than an increase of X percent.  Percentage points (pp) are a way
of expressing the arithmetical difference between two percentages.  Consider someone’s likely reaction if
told their interest rate was to rise by 1.5 percentage points; it would mean they would either receive or pay
out an additional 1.5% of the value of their debt or investment on every payment period.  This is not a
development that is likely to be dismissed as ‘only’ an increase of 1.5 points.  Yet Ronald Dworkin’s review
of The Shape of the River cites the aforementioned finding as conclusive evidence that “the damage
affirmative action inflicts on any particular non-preferred candidate is very small.”  Ronald Dworkin,
Affirming Affirmative Action, 45 N.Y. REV. BOOKS No. 16, Oct. 22, 1998.  (Cf. Dworkin’s 1978 position,
supra note 7.)  
Similarly, another review of The Shape of the River notes that it “demolished” a  “conservative
shibboleth” in finding that “overall white probability of admission would rise by only 1.5 percentage
points.”  See Ellis Close, Cutting Through Race Rhetoric, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 28, 1998, at 75; see also
Andre Douglas Pond Cummings, “Never Let Me Slip, ‘Cause If I Slip, Then I’m Slippin’’’: California’s
Paranoid Slide from Bakke to Proposition 209, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 59, 70 at n.48 (1998) (citing Close,
supra, at 24.).  Likewise, though adopting a generally skeptical position on affirmative action, Peter Schuck
characterizes the Bowen & Bok finding as meaning that whites as a group would suffer only a “trivial . . .
1.5% decline in probability of admission” and concludes that, “[a]ffirmative action in initial hiring and
college admissions presents much closer cases, for it is in these areas that the evidence best supports the
view that blacks as a group gain more from preferences than whites as a group lose.”  See Schuck, supra
note 4, at 67, 96 (emphasis added); see also P. Phillip T.K. Daniel & Kyle Edward Timken, The Rumors
of My Death Have Been Exaggerated: Hopwood’s Error in “Discarding” Bakke, 28 J. L. & EDUC. 391,
414 (1999) (citing Bowen & Bok as finding that “eliminating affirmative action programs would raise white
applicants’ chances of admission no more than 1.5 percent.”).  
See also Thomas J. Espenshade & Chang Y. Chung, The Opportunity Cost of Admission
Preferences at Elite Universities, 86 SOC. SCI. Q. No. 2 293, 297 (2005) (arguing that “removing
consideration of race would have a minimal effect on white applicants to elite universities.”); Thomas J.
Kane, Racial and Ethnic Preferences in College Admissions 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 971, 992 (1999), (stating that
“eliminating the [‘handicapped parking’] space would have only a minuscule effect on the average parking
search for nondisabled drivers”); Linda Wightman, The Consequences of Race-blindness: Revisiting
Prediction Models with Current Law School Data, 53 J. LEGAL. ED. 229, 240 (2003) (disputing “[c]laims
that minority-group admission preferences are solely, or even primarily, responsible for qualified white
applicants failing to gain admission.”); see generally Linda Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal
Education: An Empirical Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School
Admission Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1997). 
In light of the academic and judicial reception of Liu’s work,28 it seems
fair to say that within the otherwise bitterly contested terrain of the affirmative
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29. See generally Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don’t Tell, Don’t Ask: Narrow Tailoring after
Grutter and Gratz, 85 TEX. L. REV. 517 (2007) (providing an illuminating contribution to the debate on
the method by which this analysis ought to be conducted).
30. See generally Bakke, 438 U.S. at 269-325.  In substance, this question is simply a provocative
rephrasing of the policy debate inaugurated by Justice Powell’s Bakke compromise—how much value does
a racially diverse student body add to a student’s college and/or professional education?   For a recent
(favorable) review of the social science literature, see Faye J. Crosby & Amy E. Smith, The University of
Michigan Cases: Social Scientific Studies of Diversity and Fairness in Richard L. Wiener et al. eds. SOCIAL
CONSCIOUSNESS IN LEGAL DECISION MAKING (2007).
31. See generally Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297 (1990)
(offering a thoughtful perspective on this question).
32. A practice which is difficult to conceptually distinguish from racial preferencing; witness the
elision of the two in Justice Powell’s formulation of the Fourteenth Amendment standard in Bakke, “when
a State’s distribution of benefits or imposition of burdens hinges on ancestry or the color of a person’s
skin.” Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320.
33. This is a hotly contested issue.  See e.g., David L. Chambers et al., The Real Impact of
Eliminating Affirmative Action in American Law Schools: An Empirical Critique of Richard Sander’s
Study, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1855 (2005); Richard O. Lempert et al., Affirmative Action in American Law
Schools: A Critical Response to Richard Sander’s “A Reply to Critics” 45-47 (John M. Olin Center for
Law & Economics  Working Paper Series,  No. 60,  2006) ,  avai lab le  a t
http://law.bepress.com/umichlwps/olin/art60 (demonstrating the ongoing scholarly dispute between
Professors Sander and Lempert et al.); Richard H. Sander, A Reply to Critics, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1963
(2005); Richard H. Sander, A Systematic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57
STAN. L. REV. 367 (2005).  Cf. Stacy Berg Dale & Alan B.Krueger, Estimating the Payoff to Attending a
More Selective College: An Application of Selection on Observables and Unobservables, 117 Q. J. ECON
No. 4, 1491, 1523 (Nov. 2002) (concluding that “[s]tudents who attend more selective colleges do not earn
more than other students who were accepted and rejected by comparable schools but attended less selective
colleges.”)      
34. One can open virtually any volume of any law review and be confident of finding an exposition
of this question.
action debate, a consensus has developed around the stakes for white
applicants, namely, that they are minimal.  In refuting the grounds for this
consensus, it is appropriate to note what my analysis will not address.  The
essay will not consider whether the burden on majority applicants is justified
or outweighed by considerations that favor the maintenance of affirmative
action.29  Conversely, it will not assess the possible benefits to white
matriculants of the use of minority racial preferences in the admissions
procedure of their institution.30  Likewise, this essay will not examine the
question of whether white applicants are “socially innocent” or previously
advantaged by virtue of their race such that any negative consequences
affirmative action causes them to bear are not properly regarded as a burden.31
Equally, it makes no assumptions as to the appropriateness of the use of other
“plus-factors” such as legacy preferences.32  Finally, I offer no analysis of the
effectiveness of policies of affirmative action33 or their constitutionality.34
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35. See Liu, supra note 9, at 1049.
36. Id. at 1074.
37. To find a percentage increase you take the difference as a fraction of the original amount and
multiply it by 100.  Thus, 32/193 * 100/1 = 3200/193 = 16.58%
38. Id.
III. THE EFFECT OF MINORITY PREFERENCES ON THE WHITE APPLICANT
The difficulty with the consensus position on the stakes for majority
applicants is that it mistakes the difference in two percentage likelihoods of
an event occurring (A and B) for a percentage increase/decrease in likelihood
from A to B.  This is a straightforward mathematical error.  To demonstrate
the mistake, I will review the examples given by Liu himself—examples taken
to show that “the admission of minority applicants and the rejection of white
applicants are largely independent events, improperly linked through a
causation fallacy.”35
[T]he hypothetical race-neutral [i.e., ‘race-blind’] likelihood of admis-
sion for all applicants within a given SAT interval may be estimated
by dividing the total number of applicants actually admitted by the
total number of applicants.  This assumes that admissions officers
would admit applicants with similar SAT scores (black or white) at
the same rate, and that the number of applicants actually admitted
within a given SAT interval equals the number that would have been
admitted under a race-neutral process. Within the 1200-1249 SAT
interval, for example, Bowen and Bok’s five selective institutions
admitted 543 out of 2816 white applicants and 147 out of 245 black
applicants in 1989—a total of 690 out of 3061 applicants. Thus, the
hypothetical likelihood of admission for an average applicant (white
or black) scoring 1200-1249 on the SAT would have been 22.5% (690
divided by 3,061)—only slightly higher than the actual 19.3% rate of
admission for whites in this SAT interval.36
The notion that 22.5% is only “slightly” higher than 19.3% derives from a
belief that the former percentage is merely 3.2% greater than the latter.  This
is incorrect.  Working with these figures, the white applicant is 16.6% more
likely to gain admission under a race-blind selection procedure than he is
under a race-sensitive selection procedure.37  Arguably at least, an increase of
this order in an applicant’s chances of admission is substantial.  Using the
same statistical method, Liu assesses the figures for the applicants to the
University of Michigan with whom Jennifer Gratz competed for admission.
Within the group of applicants having test scores equivalent to Gratz, white
applicants had a 32% chance of admission.38  Had the university admitted
applicants at the same overall rate regardless of race, the likelihood of
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39. Id.
40. Id. at 1074.
41. 7/32 * 100/1 = 700/32 = 21.875%.  Increases of this magnitude seem to challenge the
characterization of affirmative action as having “little effect on the odds of admission” for majority
applicants.  See Samuel Issacharoff, Can Affirmative Action Be Defended?, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 669, 693
(1998).  Moreover, the comparison of admission rates for minority and majority applicants within given
test score intervals may itself understate the effect of racial preferencing.  See Espenshade, supra note 28,
at 293 (demonstrating that whites are majority recipients of certain other non accomplishment plus factors
such as legacy preferences); RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE, AND AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION 166, 235 n.75, 300 n.70 (1996) (discussing the impact of geography preferences); Kane, supra note
28, at 988 (discussing the impact of socio-economic preferences), though the latter produce a mild
redistributive effect.  The success rate for whites may thus be greater than for minority applicants with
equivalent test scores and non-test score accomplishments.  Consequently, dividing the number of
admissions at each test score interval by the number of applicants with those scores may understate the rate
at which whites could expect to gain admission in the absence of racial preferencing.  
admission for an average applicant with Gratz’s test score interval would have
been 39%.39  Liu extrapolates from this:
[A]ffirmative action increased the average likelihood of rejection for
white applicants from 61% to 68%.  Affirmative action, to be sure,
had some effect. But the key point is that admissions decisions
concerning white applicants remain, on average, far better explained
by an applicant’s combined qualifications than by the effect of
affirmative action.40  
But the effect of affirmative action in the Gratz scenario is greater than that
indicated by Liu’s analysis.  If affirmative action was prohibited, the white
applicant’s chances of success would increase from 32% to 39%.  This
represents an increase of 22% in her likelihood of admission,41 or a decrease
of 10% in her likelihood of rejection.  The latter figure is the product of an
alternative means of characterizing changes in probability—one which would
make a majority applicant’s loss appear less consequential.  Thus, instead of
saying that a majority applicant has a 32% chance of success, we say that he
has a 68% chance of failure.  The loss of seven such ‘failure’ percentage
points seems of less importance than going from a 32% to a 39% chance of
success.  However, two points need to be borne in mind.  First, losing seven
percentage points of a 68% probability is equivalent to a 10.3%, not a 7%
drop in that probability (7/68 * 100/1 = 700/68 = 10.294%).  
More importantly, in the context of disputes about resources, conceiving
probabilities of failure as the subject of “change of status” analyses is itself
problematic.  The idea that one may hold a property interest in one’s chances
of getting something—an assumption underpinning claims of discrimination
by eligible applicants of any race—does not extend to one’s chances of not
getting something.  The reason our odds of getting something holds an interest
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42. 529 U.S. 1050 (2000).  See Kim, supra note 12, at 27-28.
43. Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d at 701-02.
44. See Kim, supra note 12, at 27.
45. Id.  We need not concern ourselves with the impact of the other weightings on white chances
of admission.
46. 54/230 * 100/1 = 5400/230 = 23.487%.
47. See Kim, supra note 12, at 28.  Kim applies Liu’s approach to similar effect in analysing
Barbara Grutter’s chances of admission; “[i]n the year Grutter applied, 29 out of 135, or 21.5% of all
applicants with similar GPAs and LSAT scores were admitted.  The acceptance rate for Caucasians with
these grades and scores under the Law School’s diversity policy was 19.3%.  Thus, under a race-blind
admissions policy Grutter’s odds of admission would have been 2.2% higher.”  Id. at 30.  On the contrary,
for us is because the same can be said of the “something” in question.  Thus,
assuming we do not have a property interest in securing the failure of our
application, we cannot be said to have a property interest in retaining a
particular probability of the occurrence of that outcome.  Moreover, insofar
as we have no interest in retaining a probability of failure in the face of its
reduction, it is quite unlike any other property.  On either conception of
admission/hiring likelihood though, one’s impression of the percentage change
facing affirmative action plaintiffs is likely to affect one’s view of the
significance of that change.  Accordingly, clarity as to the meaning of
percentage representations is important.
Following Liu, Pauline Kim provides a mathematical analysis of the
impact on white applicants of the selection policy at issue in Tuttle v.
Arlington County School Board.42  Tuttle did not involve selective university
admissions policies, but a policy for allocating seats in an oversubscribed
elementary school, which, for our purposes, presents a straight analogy.  After
offering seats to applicants whose siblings already attended the school, the
Arlington School Board conducted a weighted lottery to fill the remaining
seats in the kindergarten class.  In order to increase the probability of selecting
children from certain groups, weights were assigned based on a number of
factors, including race.43  Dropping the weightings, the white plaintiffs in
Tuttle stood a 28.4% chance of securing non-sibling admission.  Under the
Arlington School Board’s diversity policy, however, their odds of admission
stood at 23%.44  According to Kim, “[t]he concrete impact of the Arlington
School Board’s policy, then, was not to deny the plaintiffs places in the
kindergarten class at [the school in question], but to decrease their odds of
admission by something less than 5.4%.”45
On its face, Kim’s conclusion is incorrect.  The elimination of the
Arlington County School’s diversity policy would increase the white
applicant’s odds of admission from 23% to 28.4%—an increase of 23.5%, not
an increase of 5.4%.46  Again, one would be hard-pressed to regard such an
increase as “slight.”47  Interestingly, having set out her findings, Kim footnotes
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under a race-blind admissions policy, Grutter’s odds of admission would be 11.4% higher: 22/193 * 100/1
= 2200/193 = 11.398%.
48. Id. at n.85.
49. Note that the percentage loss in odds of success experienced by white applicants does not in
itself reveal the extent of a scheme of minority preferencing.  A white applicant would suffer a twenty-five
percent loss in his probability of success regardless of the number of seats shifted from white to minority
applicants by virtue of affirmative action as long as that number remained a quarter of the total number of
white applications that would otherwise have been successful.  Thus, the percentage loss suffered by the
white applicant and the percentage of resources that are redirected towards preferred groups are not
necessarily the same thing.  Put differently, to establish the overall cost to society of a policy of affirmative
a direct challenge to the prevailing mathematical method of representing
change using percentages:  
Although mathematically accurate, this characterization [the 19%
decrease in “white” odds of success brought about by affirmative
action (from 28.4% to 23%)] removes from view the expected chance
of success in the absence of any race-conscious policy.  Particularly
when that chance was low to begin with, expressing the loss in terms
of a percentage reduction in odds misleadingly suggests a greater
absolute loss to white plaintiffs than is in fact the case.48
The first point to note is that in the context of a lawsuit seeking prospective
relief, talk of decreases in odds is itself misleading.  Tuttle’s white plaintiffs
were challenging the use of a racial preference in applicant selection.
Removing that preference would increase their odds of success rather than
prevent any decrease in their odds.  It thus seems more accurate to talk of a
23.5% change in probability rather than a 19% change in probability.  Second,
“mathematical accuracy” does not permit mutually-contradictory alternatives
to both qualify as answers to an arithmetical question.  The reason that the
expression of loss as a percentage reduction removes from view the paucity
of the expected chance of success in the absence of race-conscious policies is
because that chance of success in no way answers the question Kim has asked:
What loss did the white plaintiff suffer?  A person’s loss can only be
measured against what they possessed prior to the relevant event.  The fact
that they had less of something prior to that event as compared to another
person to whom the event has affected in the same way does not mean that the
diminution of what they possessed is any less significant to them.  We could
say that what the plaintiffs had was insignificant to begin with, such that their
loss of it was also insignificant.  But this is not a point which can be made by
comparing “before and after” odds of success in the manner of Kim and Liu.
On the contrary, it is dependent on the assertion that the plaintiff-applicants
had no worthwhile chance of admission in the first place, such that they would
suffer no injury if it was taken away from them – for any reason.49  
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action, it is indeed necessary to reflect on the value of the white applicant’s chances of admission in the
absence of minority racial preferencing.
50. An alternative approach to characterizing the loss produced by affirmative action is by way of
decision theory.  See generally ROBERT T. CLEMEN, MAKING HARD DECISIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
DECISION ANALYSIS (1996).  Specifically, we might use the concept of expected value, eV = P*V (where
V is the payoff, and P is the probability of it being realised), to represent the impact on white applicants.
Taking The Shape of the River data reviewed by Liu, we have a 19.3% chance of success for a white
applicant at a given SAT interval, which, with the suspension of racial preferencing, would rise to 22.5%.
Let’s assume that the lifetime payoff for gaining admission to the applied school over and above
the next most preferred school is $10,000.  For the sake of argument, let us also assume that this payoff is
equivalent for all the applicants at this SAT interval.  At 100% probability of success, the expected value
of the application to the applicant would equal $10,000.  For every percentile decrease in probability, the
application will be worth exactly $100 less to the applicant, and vice versa.  At first glance, this would
appear to bear out Liu’s approach: under decision theory, the increase in value between the 19.3% and
22.5% rates of probability is an absolute figure, not one which is calculated using relative gains and losses.
 But while decision theory offers an absolute scale with which to measure loss, it also involves
characterizing losses in tangible terms.  Thus, on Liu’s figures, an SAT equivalent white applicant’s
application is worth $1,930 under affirmative action, whereas it would be worth $2,250 in its absence.  This
works out at a $320 loss for the white applicant by reason of his race.  Were the impact of affirmative action
on majority applicants conveyed in such terms, it seems doubtful that the loss would prove politically or
Moreover, a percentage cannot express an “absolute loss.”  It cannot
therefore suggest a “misleading” one.  The idea of a percentage is that value
A is placed in terms of value B, where the latter is equivalent to the figure
“100.”  As such, a percentage is necessarily a relational proposition, not an
absolute one.  One could not lose an absolute percentage of something— that
is a contradiction in terms.  To say that one has lost 5.4% is to say that one has
lost a quantity of something whose original value is stipulated to be “100.”
The complicating factor is that in Tuttle, and in similar scenarios, the
something in question is a percentage of something else.  The Tuttle 28.4%
thus becomes the entity whose value we are stipulating to be “100” for the
purposes of our expression.  To lose 5.4% of 28.4(%) is to lose a quantity you
have stipulated to equate to 1.5.  Yet in Tuttle the white plaintiffs lost more
than 1.5 of their 28.4.  On the contrary, they lost 5.4 of their 28.4.  The
analysis of change is a relational assessment.  To assess it, we must first find
our data points, compare them, establish which data point represents the
original position, then relate any differences between original and subsequent
data points in terms of the value represented by the former.  The only
mathematical method of representing this last step is by stipulating a
numerical value for the original position (“100”) and expressing the difference
as a fraction of this value, that is, in percentage terms.  In short, the Liu
method errs by confusing the difference in the percentage likelihoods of white
admission under and absent minority preferencing with the percentage
increase/decrease from one percentage of likelihood to the other.  As such, its
view of the arithmetic of selective admissions is mistaken.50  
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legally acceptable.  See Liu, supra note 9, at 1106.  (Technically, for white applicants, race blind selection
exhibits first order stochastic dominance over racially preferred selection.)  We find an oblique reference
to decision theory in Justice Breyer’s dissent in Parents Involved in Community Schools.  Making the point
that the program at issue was less detrimental to unsuccessful white applicants than that approved in
Grutter, Justice Breyer noted that “[d]isappointed students are not rejected from a State’s flagship graduate
program; they simply attend a different one of the district’s many public schools, which in aspiration and
in fact are substantially equal.”  Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 127 S. Ct. at 2825 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
51. See e.g., supra note 28 (discussing the application of the Bowen & Bok finding of an increase
of 1.5 percentage points in white probability of admission).  An increase of 1.5 percentage points
corresponds to a 6 percent increase in probability.
52. See Kane, supra note 28, at 993.  Even the trenchantly anti-affirmative action review of Bok &
Bowen by Stephan & Abigail Thernstrom, Reflections on the Shape of the River 46 UCLA. L. REV. 1583,
1629 (1999) implicitly concedes the substance of Kane’s point as it relates to whites: 
[w]hite resentment, they claim, is like the annoyance many drivers feel at “handicapped
parking spaces.”  Doing away with “the reserved space would have only a minuscule effect
on parking options for non-disabled drivers,”. . . [yet] it is not only whites who are excluded
when blacks and Hispanics are admitted to schools by racial double standards. . . . The cost
of racial double standards in admissions is currently being paid by many Asian students.)
Id.
53. See Kane, supra note 28, at 992.
Professor Liu’s work is not alone in underestimating the effects of
affirmative action on majority applicants.  Thus, notwithstanding the data
presented by Bowen and Bok in The Shape of the River, we cannot attribute
an increase of ‘only’ X percentage points unless we are satisfied that the
percentage change in position appears equally insignificant.51  Consider
Thomas Kane’s hypothetical demonstration of the (mistaken) causation
fallacy: 
[M]any families are likely to misperceive the impact of racial
preference in college admissions.  Harvard College, for example,
accepts roughly 10 out of 100 applicants.  Only 1.5 out of the 10 that
are admitted (15 percent of students) are black or Hispanic.  Even if
ending racial preferences excluded all black and Hispanic students (an
upper-bound estimate, since many minority applicants would be
admitted using color-blind procedures), only 1.5 out of the 90
students who were denied admission would now find a space.  Yet, if
more than 1.5 out of the 90 students who are now denied think they
would be the next person in line when racial preferences are ended,
the perceived costs of affirmative action are likely to exceed the
actual costs.52
However, the effect on the average white admissions search of the diversion
of 1.5 admissions by way of minority preferencing is not “minuscule.”53  In
keeping with the spirit of Kane’s hypothetical, let’s assume that all 100
applicants are otherwise equally qualified for the 10 positions and that only
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54. We would need to make further assumptions about the scenario to calculate the exact increase
in probability, but these figures suffice to make the general point.
55. Linda Wightman, The Consequences of Race-Blindness: Revisiting Prediction Models with
Current Law School Data 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 229 (2003).
56. Id. at 231.
1 out of the 1.5 minority admissions depended on affirmative action.  In such
circumstances, it is certainly true that any given member of the 90
disappointed applicants would be foolish to think that they had been displaced
by the operation of Harvard’s racial preference.  But they would not therefore
be wrong in thinking that the preference had cost them significantly.  Under
affirmative action, non-racially preferred applicants would have a 9.1%
chance of admission (99 competitors, 9 admissions).  In the absence of affir-
mative action, each of the 100 applicants has a 10% chance of success (100
competitors, 10 seats).  Consequently, were affirmative action suspended in
Kane’s hypothetical, the chances of success for non-racially preferred
applicants would increase by 10%.54  Unlike many of the benefits of higher
education, of course, likelihoods are intangible.  Nevertheless, the loss of a
given likelihood of success is not merely a perceived loss—it is as genuine as
the loss of the opportunity to draw as many cards as one’s opponent in a game
of chance.  
The well-known Wightman study of the effects on the composition of
US law school matriculants of abandoning racial preferences (as updated in
2003) avoids the particular error we have been discussing; however, in
analyzing the benefits accruing to majority applicants, it commits a
comparable one.55  Analyzing data from 68,029 applicants to 179 law schools
during the 2000-01 application year, Wightman uses combined LSAT/GPA
logistic regression models to predict the admission decisions that would have
been reached in the absence of the consideration of race (and all other non-test
score data).  The 68,029 applicants in question generated 323,381 law school
applications, averaging 5.1 applications per applicant.  Nearly three-quarters
of the applicants received at least one offer of admission.56  From her analysis,
Wightman concludes that:
The impact on white applicants of considering race as a factor in
making admission decisions is not so dramatic as is sometimes
suggested.  There were nearly 9,000 applications from white
applicants that resulted in an offer of admission but would have been
rejected under the numbers-only [test-score only] model that was
tested. . . . The numbers of applicants from minority groups who were
admitted, but who would not have been by the same numbers-only
model, was relatively small, especially compared with the just-noted
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57. Id. at 252-53
58. Id. at 239, tbl. 4.  Drawing this position from the figures means assuming a non-negative
relationship between test scores and other accomplishments, and an equal inter-racial distribution of non-
test score accomplishments.  Leaving aside applications from applicants marked “other/no response,” the
net number of minority applications which decisively benefited by non test score considerations (7,717)
was effectively equal to the net number of white applications which were decisively disadvantaged by non
test score considerations (7,642).  Admittee “yield” is discussed below.  Id.
59. Individual variations are irrelevant to determining the impact of minority preferences on a
hypothetical majority applicant.  To assess change in the chances of a hypothetical majority applicant we
need to examine the sum of these individual variations, namely, the net failure of majority applications
under a race conscious selection element.
60. Wightman, supra note 55, at 239, tbl. 4.
61. Id. at 237.
numbers of . . . applications from white applicants that would have
been denied.57  
Wightman’s conclusion is problematic for a number of reasons.  The number
of preferred applications which were admitted, but which would not have been
admitted without a minority racial preference, is necessarily equal to the
number of non-preferred applications that were denied by the inclusion of race
as a factor.  This is the only logical position, and it is duly reflected in
Wightman’s own figures.58  Wightman notes that the number of applicants
from minority groups who would not have been admitted anywhere but for
non-test score considerations is smaller than the number of white applications
which would not have been admitted but for non-test considerations.  But
comparing the success of minority applicants to majority applications is not
relevant to establishing the impact on white applicants of factoring race into
admissions decisions.  Moreover, the number of white applications which
would not have succeeded in the absence of non-test score considerations
(9,000) has no direct bearing on an assessment of the effect of non-test score
considerations on whites.59  Uncovering this effect involves finding the net
number of white applications rejected/accepted by virtue of the application of
non-test score considerations.  Using Wightman’s own data, we find that
applying non-test score considerations leads to a 7,642 net decline in the
number of successful white applications, i.e., the 8,729 white applications
advantaged by non-test score considerations less the 16,371 white applications
disadvantaged by such considerations.60  Though Wightman does not advert
to the finding in presenting the overall proportions of law school applications
admitted and predicted-to-be-admitted as per test score by racial group, the
study’s third Table reflects this figure.61  In the 2000-01 round of applications,
LSAT/UGPA scores predicted that 47% of white applications would be
admitted.  The percentage of white applications actually admitted is given as
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62. Thus, 216,997 applications were submitted by whites in 2001.  Forty-three percent of that
number is approx 93,309 applications (the proportion of white applications actually admitted);  9.3% of
93,309 is 8,678 applications;  8,678 plus 93,309 successful applications equals 101,987, which constitutes
47% the total number of white applications (47% being the proportion of white applications for which test
scores predict admission).
63. See Wightman supra note 55, at 234, tbl. 1.  Thus, Wightman reports that whereas in 1991 there
were 72,742 white applicants, by 2001 that figure had fallen to 47,541.  Conversely, the number of
preferred applicants had increased by 774.  Post-2001 data suggests a return to early nineties applicant
levels.  See Lempert, supra note 33; Michael A. Olivas, Law School Admissions After Grutter: Student
Bodies, Pipeline Theory, and the River, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 16, 25-27 (2005). 
64. We must of course qualify this point as it relates to Asian-American applicants; Asian-
Americans have higher test scores than any other racial group, including whites, and, with the latter,
comprise the class of non-preferred applicants.  See Wightman, supra note 55, at 237, tbl. 3.  
65. Id.  
66. California and Washington State’s public law schools have been unable to use racial preferences
since the passage of Proposition 209 (1996) and Initiative 200 (1998) respectively.  A similar prohibition
applies to Michigan’s public law schools since the passage of Proposal 2 in late 2006.  For almost a decade,
43%.  Accordingly, had affirmative action been abolished, white applications
would have enjoyed a 9.3% greater chance of admission.62  
Moreover, there is reason to believe that this figure understates the boost
to white applications produced by the removal of minority preferencing.  First,
though Wightman made use of the most recent data then available, matching
prior and subsequent trends suggests that 2000-01 may have represented an
ebb position in the number of majority-race law school applications.63  The
proportion of majority-race applications is important because the bigger it is,
the higher the test score average of the applicant pool.  The higher the test
score average, the more difficult it is for groups with relatively low test scores
to compete for admission.  Thus, the greater the proportion of majority
applications in the general pool, the greater the need for minority preferences
to ensure the same proportion of minority admissions, which leads to larger
racial preferences.64  
This factor is illustrated through comparison with Wightman’s data for
1991;65 a year with a much higher volume of applications than 2001.  The
1991 figures show an LSAT/GPA predicted rate of admission for white
applications of 30% with an actual admission rate of 26%—making the 1991
abolition of affirmative action worth an increase of 15.4% in a white
applicant’s chances of admission to his preferred law school.  The post-2001
growth in the volume of white applications suggests that in the event of an
abolition of affirmative action, a 9.3% figure for the resulting increase in
“white” chances of admission may be on the lower side.  
Second, among the 179 law schools whose admission rates are
accumulated, Wightman’s figures take no account of those which do not use
racial preferences.66  Evidently, a national abolition of affirmative action
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Florida and Texas have experimented with less emphatic proscriptions of affirmative action in higher
education.  For an overview of the impact of such measures on minority admissions, see Michelle Locke,
“Race Blind” Admissions Controversy Still Smolders,  WASH. POST, May 7, 2007, at A06.
67. See Wightman, supra note 55, at 241.  Wightman notes that “the number of white applications
that would have been granted a positive admission decision increased by 8 percent when the analysis
assured that the predicted-to-be-admitted number matched the number actually admitted.”  Id.  The figure
of 8% is mistaken—we saw that the correct figure (ignoring for a moment the study’s methodological
imprecisions) is 9.3%.  Wightman appears to produce the 8% figure by calculating the percentage increase
from the white proportion of all those applications actually admitted (73.4%, Table 4) to the proportion of
admitted applications that would have been white had the LSAT/UGPA score predictions held true (79.3%,
Table 4).  However, the proportion of all successful applications belonging to a particular race is not the
same as the proportion of applications made by that racial group which were successful.  A critical
determinant in the former is the relative size of the group vis-à-vis the other groups that have made
successful applications.  Relative group size is immaterial in the latter measurement—allowing us to
compare success rates across racial groups of different sizes (such as whites, blacks etc.).
68. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 11, at 33-34.
69. Id. at 35.
would provide no boost for white applications to such schools.  But the
presence of such schools in Wightman’s data pushes the national rate of actual
admission for white applications closer to the national LSAT/GPA predicted
rate of admission.  In the absence of non-affirmative action schools, the actual
rate of white admission would be marginally less and the difference between
it and the predicted rate of white admission would be greater.  The admissions
chances of white applicants from 2001 who were subject to minority
preferencing would therefore have benefited by something greater than 9.3%
had such preferencing been abolished.  This conclusion is confirmed when we
recall that the other non-test score, non-accomplishment factors that law
schools commonly take into account—such as geography, socio-economic
status and legacies—tend to benefit more majority applicants than minority
ones.  The lack of control for such factors in the Wightman analysis means
that this tendency may work to downplay the full effect of minority racial
preferences on the white success rate.67  
A further factor associated with the case for considering minority pre-
ferencing a minimal burden on majority applications is ‘matriculant yield’—
the number of matriculants produced by the offer of a given number of
admissions.  As this factor is commonly put forward in the literature support-
ing the causation ‘fallacy’, it is appropriate to canvass it before concluding.
The idea is that when admissions processes use racial preferences, the yield
“tends to be lower for highly qualified black candidates than for comparable
white candidates because the black candidates are likely to be admitted by
more schools.”68  In the absence of racial preferences, however, the rate at
which black applicants accept offers of admission “would almost surely rise”
and “would move up toward the white yield.”69  The elimination of affirmative
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70. See Liu, supra note 9, at 1076-77.
71. This dynamic applies to all non-preferred racial groups.  Note also the need to avoid circularity
in this argument; lower minority yield cannot be attributed to a phenomenon of more minority offers where
the existence of that phenomenon is then attributed to lower minority yield.
action is said to mean that selective institutions would not need to make as
many offers of admission as they otherwise would in order to fill the same
number of seats.  By decreasing the total number of offers required to produce
the same number of matriculants, the projected increase in black yield tends
to lower the hypothetical race-blind rate of admission, thereby reducing the
increase in white chances of admission were minority preferences abolished.70
At first glance, the hypothesis appears plausible.  But a close inspection
reveals that a “yield variable” has no place in assessing the impact of affirma-
tive action on white applicants.  At a practical level, minority applicants are
more likely than equivalent whites to have received offers of admission from
private educational institutions—the very top tier of which are more
prestigious than even the most prestigious public schools.  Given that many
private institutions pursue affirmative action policies and the virtual certainty
that a constitutional finding against such policies would be confined to public
institutions, the presumptive reason for lower black yield would still apply in
the event of a conservative overturning of the Bakke/Grutter licence.  Con-
versely, to the extent that an abolition of affirmative action does decrease the
number of minority applicants with better offers, it will increase the number
of white applicants with better offers.  This in turn will decrease the rate of
white yield, applying upward pressure on the number of admission offers
required to secure the same number of matriculants, thereby countering the
downward pressure produced by the increase in black yield.  In other words,
if affirmative action accounts for lower black yield, it must also account for
higher white yield.  With its generation of correspondingly more offers of
admission for whites, we can expect an abolition of affirmative action to
decrease white yield at every test score interval by an amount corresponding
to the decrease in black yield at every interval that was due to affirmative
action.71  The net result is that average applicant yield would be unaffected by
the abolition of racial preferencing.  Consequently, we have no reason to
believe that universities would need to make fewer offers of admission to
produce the same number of matriculants.  As such, in the absence of
affirmative action, we can expect the race-blind rate of admission at each test
score interval to be unaffected by matriculant yield, and hence to hold its
position relative to the non-preferred applicants’ rate of admission.  Racial
variations in yield thus provide no evidence for thinking that the increase in
a majority applicant’s chances would be less than otherwise estimated.  
2008] MISPLACED CONSENSUS 465
72. This is the case despite some disagreement over the typical weight of racial preferences.
Whereas some advocates of affirmative action tend to downplay its impact in admissions decisions, see
STANLEY FISH, THE TROUBLE WITH PRINCIPLE 32 (1999), others take the view that its weight is substantial
and should be acknowledged as such, see Liu, supra note 9, at 1067; see generally Issacharoff, supra note
41.  Note Issacharoff’s embarrassment at a claim in a court brief to which his name was attached that “race
operated as simply one of many criteria that went into a selection process.”  Id. at n.14. 
73. This applies to all measures that consider race in the distribution of resources, be they explicit
or substantive.  Thus, “race neutral” distributions that refer to factors chosen for their correlation with race
rather than to race itself, direct, on the basis of race, an amount of resources towards particular racial groups
within a larger group of potential recipients.  Indeed any race conscious measure that distributes resources
in ways that are more to some people’s liking than others involves allocating a quantity of resources
according to race.  For discussion of indirectly race conscious measures and a possible distinction in terms
of the evils of individual racial classification, see Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle, 127 S. Ct. at 2788 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
IV. CONCLUSION
In the assessment of an application for admission to a selective
institution, it is common ground that, notwithstanding policies of affirmative
action, a range of factors will be considered.72  Accordingly, the question of
what causes a majority applicant to fail to gain admission will likely depend
on a number of factors.  However, in assessing the impact of race in selective
admissions decisions, it would be a mistake to assume that affirmative action
causes only minimal decreases in the odds of admission for white applicants.
The mistake is not that the decreases are invariably substantial.  Rather, it is
that one cannot calculate a percentage decrease by equating it to the difference
in quality A “before and after” the occurrence of event B.  
In assessing the costs of affirmative action, however, the question arises
as to whether it makes sense to concentrate on its impact on individual
applicants—preferred or non-preferred.  Ultimately, all forms of minority
racial preferencing operate to direct, on the basis of race, an amount of
resources towards particular racial groups within a larger group of potential
recipients.73  The percentage by which non-preferred probabilities of success
decrease is a function of the quantity of resources so directed, i.e., the number
of decisively disadvantaged white and Asian applications, and the proportion
of non-preferred applications.  Accordingly the impact of affirmative action
on a non-preferred applicant’s chances of admission will be exclusively
determined by the number of non-preferred applications that are to be
decisively disadvantaged (and pre-application perceptions thereof).  In this
context, arguments about the significance of an individual’s loss in odds of
success appear to act as proxies for arguments about the quantity (if any) of
the existing resources that ought to be distributable on the basis of race.  That
this underlying question lends itself to the language of quotas would seem a
poor reason for policy analysis to concentrate on derivative measures of
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74. “Racial quota” has been a loaded term in political discourse.  A prominent example of its
imputed connotations is the “white hands commercial” run by Jesse Helms in his United States Senate
campaign against challenger Harvey Gantt (an African-American).  As a pair of white hands crumple a
rejection letter from an employer, a voice says, “You needed that job and you were the best qualified. . . .
But they had to give it to a minority because of a racial quota.  Is that really fair?  Harvey Gantt says it is.”
See Ed Timms & Doug J. Swanson, Racial Politics Surging as Economy Declines, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Dec. 2, 1990, at 1A (quoting commercial).  See also Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Action and
Discrimination, 39 HOW. L.J. 1 at 32-35 (1995) (discussing the impact of “quota” characterization in
Supreme Court jurisprudence).
75. Otherwise, the “plus” experienced by applicants by virtue of affirmative action could be
discounted to reveal how many admittees would have lost their place in its absence.  
76. Recall that opportunity cost is not the same as a “perception cost,” i.e., the distinct cost to
society of some of its members feeling disadvantaged by the operation of affirmative action, where such
policies are an otherwise appropriate practice.  Though occasionally canvassed by commentators favorable
to affirmative action, the point appears vulnerable to the rejoinder that to alter policy on the basis of such
feelings would represent a deliberate indulgence of racist prejudice. See generally Dworkin, supra note 7;
Kane, supra note 28,
77. Or, for that matter, with any disadvantages borne by members of preferred groups.  For a view
supportive of the salience of the stigma question, see generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY (1991).  Empirical research on the impact of affirmative action fuelled stigma
is inconclusive, for a brief overview see Faye J. Crosby et al., Understanding Affirmative Action, 57 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 585, 593-94 (2006).
program cost.74  Such an approach is unnecessary and may be unhelpful.  It is
unnecessary because the only reason an administrator would be unable to
determine the identity of preferred candidates who would not have succeeded
but for the preference (and hence the quantity of resources allocated according
to race) is that such candidacies are not fully commensurable with the
candidacies of non-preferred candidates.  However, such incommensurability
could only come about where a separate track for acquiring a given quantity
of the resource has been established for preferred candidates.75  In either case,
we are measuring the extent of a particular direction of resources on the basis
of race.  
Moreover, a focus on derivative measures of cost is unhelpful insofar as
it conveys the impression that the cost of a racial direction of public resources
falls simply on a group of individuals.  In competing for admission, applicants
of non-preferred races are collectively disadvantaged to a degree equivalent
to the advantage collectively enjoyed by applicants of preferred races.  But the
larger issue remains: Will society benefit by investing its resources along
what, in principle, are arbitrary lines?  Individual losses aside, there is the
opportunity cost to pursuing affirmative action, borne by society itself – in the
gain that would have been realized by a distribution of the resources on non-
racial grounds.76  This cost may be outweighed by the gains to society
accruing from affirmative action, but it cannot be equated simply with the
admissions disadvantages borne by non-preferred racial groups.77  As is often
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78. Michigan Law School’s “special reference to the inclusion of students from groups which have
been historically discriminated against” would seem to fall under this category.  See Grutter, 539 U.S. at
316.
79. For a number of instrumental considerations in the context of university admissions see id. at
330-32.  In the public school context, see Justice Breyer’s elaboration of the educational and democratic
elements of what he saw as the school districts’ compelling interest in using race based selection criteria
in Parents Involved in Community Schools, 127 S. Ct. at 2820-25 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
80. The Grutter decision did little to weaken the Supreme Court’s attachment to this distinction—no
“outright balancing” or “quota system.”  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 30, 34.  (For background on the Supreme
Court’s handling of “quotas,” see Spann, supra note 74, at 32-35.)  O’Connor’s distinction between racial
balancing and achieving meaningful minority numbers was subsequently invoked by the Court in its
criticism of the affirmative action policies at issue in Parents Involved in Community Schools, 127 S. Ct.
at 2743-44. 
noted in defense of affirmative action, admission to the university of one’s
choice is not “a right” in the sense of being something to which citizens are
necessarily entitled.  The corollary is that the efficiency of non-racial
distributions of public resources be overcome by weightier considerations—be
they redress based 78 or instrumental.79    
Focusing on derivative measures is also unhelpful where it encourages
the reification of labels, such as in arguments that characterize quotas as being
qualitatively distinct from “ranges.”80  Every means of minority racial
preferencing yields a university admissions advantage owing exclusively to
an applicant’s race, the racial profile of the applicant pool, and the quantity of
resources to be racially redistributed.  However sophisticated the means of
affirmative action, it will result in a quantity of resources being distributed to
members of certain racial groups that would otherwise have been distributed
to members of different racial groups.  Put differently, in any minority
preferencing scheme concerning a particular pool of resources, majority
applicants will, by virtue of their race, be automatically excluded from a
quantity of those resources commensurate to the redistributive impact of the
scheme in question. Whatever value there is to distributing this quantity of
resources without regard to race is a cost that society incurs in pursuing such
schemes.
The suggestion that the policy analysis of affirmative action heed its
character as a way of directing particular quantities of resources towards racial
groups is unlikely to appeal to its supporters.  Yet having articulated one’s
position in terms of quantities of racially-distributed resources, one might
credibly maintain that individuals are not receiving goods because of their race’s
presence in society but because of the consequences that have been (wrongly)
attached to their race’s presence in society.  The ultimate success of that a
position would be open to argument.  Before this debate can make much
headway in higher education, however, the doubts about the actual value of the
resource proposed for racial distribution—university selectivity benefits—must
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81. See Dale & Krueger, supra note 33, at 1512.  “Employers and graduate schools may value their
higher class rank [those students who choose to attend a less selective and therefore less academically
competitive college] by enough to offset any other effect of attending a less selective college on earnings.”
Id.
first be resolved.81  In the end, it may be that the latter will present a more
serious question for the practice of affirmative action by universities than any
question of principle.
